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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The State charged Amy Faye Greco with possession of a controlled substance
and injury to a child. Ms. Greco moved to suppress all of the evidence found during the
execution of a search warrant, contending that there had been an illegal warrantless
entry prior to obtaining the warrant and the warrant lacked the proper indicia of reliability
and facts to support probable cause. After a hearing on the matter, the district court
granted the suppression motion. The State appealed. Ms. Greco contends the district
court correctly suppressed the evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The prosecuting attorney charged Ms. Greco by Information with the crimes of
possession of a controlled substance and injury to children. (R., pp.22-23.) Ms. Greco
filed a suppression motion alleging that her constitutional rights under both the United
States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution were violated requiring suppression of
evidence obtained by the police.

(R., pp.35-40.)

After the district court rejected a

written Rule 11 plea agreement (R., p.51), the State objected to the suppression motion
(R., pp.53-62). The State argued that Ms, Greco gave consent for the police officers to
enter the residence (R., pp.55-57); exigent circumstances existed to enter Ms. Greco's
bedroom (R., pp.57-60); the officers had lawful authority to conduct a protective sweep
and secure the premises to obtain a search warrant (R, pp.60-61 ); and, sufficient
attenuation existed to constitute independent probable cause for issuance of a search
warrant (R., p.61 ).
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The district court conducted a hearing and took the matter under advisement.
(R, pp.73-74.) The district court found the relevant facts to be as followed:
Approximately two weeks prior to September 16, 2010, Wilder law
enforcement received information from a relative of the defendant named
"Mel" regarding possible drug activity at the residence located at 611
Mitchell in Wilder, Idaho. Mel called law enforcement to report frequent
traffic coming and going from the residence. He also advised that the
defendant had set up video monitors to view the perimeter of the house.
Mel also had concerns that the defendant's grandmother, who resides at
the same location, was having her cancer medication taken from her. Law
enforcement observed vehicles come and go from the residence for the
preceding week.
Chief Tveidt received information from the principal of Wilder
Elementary School that the defendant's son had been using marijuana.
The same information also came from another child that had been
removed from his home by Health and Welfare. Tveidt spoke with
defendant's son and he admitted to smoking marijuana and that he had a
bong in his bedroom. The defendant's son told Tveidt that people come
and go and stay for short periods of time in his mother's room.
Chief Tveidt traveled to the subject residence. The defendant's
grandmother answered the door. The defendant then stepped outside the
residence to talk with Tveidt. The defendant consented to the search of
her son's room. Tveidt then asked to search the whole house. The
defendant did not consent and indicated that she needed to ask her
grandmother for consent to search. The defendant walked into the house.
Tveidt followed her inside without invitation. After entering the house the
defendant went into her room and closed the door. Tveidt heard clanging
glass and thought the defendant was destroying evidence so he ordered
the defendant out of her room and then detained the defendant and a
man, who was in her room, so law enforcement could obtain a search
warrant. Tveidt entered into the defendant's room to check on the infant
that was in the room, and at that point he saw the video monitor she had
set up to view the perimeter of the house. The monitor displayed Wilder
patrol vehicles parked on the street in front of the residence.
Chief Tveidt then obtained a search warrant from Magistrate Judge
Frates, executed it, and law enforcement found methamphetamine,
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. On October 4, 2010, an arrest warrant
was issued for defendant and she was subsequently arrested for
Possession Of Methamphetamine and Injury to Child.
(R., pp.80-81 (citations to Search Warrant Transcript omitted).)
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The court concluded that entry by the officers into the home violated Ms. Greco's
constitutional rights because the officers lacked Ms. Greco's consent to enter the home.
(R., pp.83-86.)

Moreover, the court concluded that "had the officers not been in the

home illegally, they would not have seen or heard what they believed was evidence of a
crime." (R., p.88.) Therefore, because law enforcement created the exigency by their
uninvited entry into the home, the State was precluded from relying on the exception to
the warrant requirement.

(R., pp.86-88.)

Likewise, the officers could not justify a

protective sweep by entering into Ms. Greco's bedroom because they were unlawfully in
the home. (R., pp.88-89.) Finally, the district court concluded that the search warrant
was improperly issued because the hearsay statements of Mel and Ms. Greco's son
were unreliable, and Chief Tveidt failed to disclose to the magistrate that he entered the
house without consent and included information that was improperly obtained.
(R., pp.89-92.)
The State filed an appeal from the district court's Decision on Motion to
Suppress. (R., pp.97-100.)
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ISSUE
Has the State failed to show the district court's order granting Ms. Greco's motion to
suppress was in error?
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ARGUMENT
The State Failed To Show The District Court's Order Granting Ms. Greco's Motion To
Suppress Was In Error

A.

Introduction
Ms. Greco submits that the district court was correct in granting her motion to

suppress because her constitutional rights were violated. The State seeks reversal of
the district court's decision. However, a review of the record and applicable case law
supports the district court's order granting Ms. Greco's motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
The review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho

336, 338 (Ct. App. 2003). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are accepted;
however, the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found are freely
reviewed. State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 886 (2001 ). At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of all witnesses, weigh evidence, resolve factual conflicts
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.

State v. Valdez-Molina, 127

Idaho 102, 106 (1995). The State bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that
the challenged evidence is untainted by the police misconduct. State v. McBaine, 144
Idaho 130, 133 (Ct App. 2007).

C.

The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court's Order Granting
Ms. Greco's Motion To Suppress Was In Error
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
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U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const Art I, § 17.

"Warrantless searches are

presumptively unreasonable and the State bears the burden to demonstrate that a
warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." State v. Martinez,
129 Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted).

The United States Supreme

Court has held that when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal
proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
340, 347 (1987) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914)).
After a hearing on the matter, the district court concluded that entry by the
officers into the home violated Ms. Greco's constitutional rights because they lacked
Ms. Greco's consent to enter the home.

(R., pp.83-86.) Moreover, the court concluded

that "had the officers not been in the home illegally, they would not have seen or heard
what they believed was evidence of a crime."

(R., p.88.)

Therefore, because law

enforcement created the exigency by their uninvited entry into the home, the State was
precluded from relying on this exception to the warrant requirement

(R., pp.86-88.)

Likewise, the officers could not justify a protective sweep by entering into Ms. Greco's
bedroom because they were unlawfully in the home. (R., pp.88-89.) Finally, the district
court concluded that the search warrant was improperly issued because the hearsay
statements of Mel and Ms. Greco's son were unreliable and Chief Tveidt failed to
disclose to the magistrate that he entered the house without consent and included
information that was improperly obtained. (R., pp.89-92.)
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The State asserts that the district court erred when it determined that the officers
entered the home without Ms. Greco's consent. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) Because
the officers were lawfully in the house, the State contends that exigent circumstances
existed allowing their entry into Ms. Greco's room. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.) Finally,
the State argues that the search warrant application established probable cause even in
the absence of evidence found after their unlawful entry into the house. (R., pp.7-10.)
Ms. Greco asserts the State is incorrect.

1.

The District Court Correctly Determined That Ms. Greco Did Not Give The
Officers Consent To Enter The Home

"Voluntary consent to search from a person who has actual authority to so
consent obviates the need for a warrant." State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857, 862 (Ct. App.
2001) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974); State v. Johnson, 110
Idaho 516,522 (1986); State v. Ham, 113 Idaho 405,406 (Ct. App. 1987). '"The burden
is upon the state to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's ...
consent to search was given freely and voluntarily . . . .

[T]he voluntariness of a

consent to search must be determined from the totality of the circumstances."'

Id.

(citing State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 749 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Aitken, 121
Idaho 783, 784 (Ct. App. 1992))).
The district court found that Ms. Greco did not consent to entry of the home.
(R., p.80.) The State does not contest the district court's factual findings. (Appellant's

Brief, pp.5-6.)

The district court found the following relevant facts after listening to

testimony and hearing arguments,
The defendant's grandmother answered the door. The defendant then
stepped outside the residence to talk with Tveidt.
The defendant
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consented to the search of her son's room. Tveidt then asked to search
the whole house. The defendant did not consent and indicated that she
needed to ask her grandmother for consent to search. The defendant
walked into the house. Tveidt followed her inside without invitation.
(R., p.79.)

The instant case is very similar to State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707 (Ct. App.
1998). The Abeyta Court recognized that when a person retreats into their home to get
something and leaves the door open, that is not an invitation for police to enter.
Abeyta's subsequent consent for further entry into the residence and to search,
however, cured the unlawful entry. Id. at 708.
When Chief Tveidt followed Ms. Greco inside, he did so without consent

He

entered the house without a warrant and without a valid exception to the warrant
requirement. The State possessed the burden of proof and it failed to meet its burden
before the district court.

This Court should affirm the district court's decision to

suppress the evidence because the police unlawfully entered Ms. Greco's home.

2.

The District Court Correctly Determined That Exigent Circumstances Did
Not Justify Entry Into Ms. Greco Room Because The Police Officers Were
Unlawfully In The Home

The district court concluded that because law enforcement created the exigency
by their uninvited entry into the home, the State was precluded from relying on the
exception to the warrant requirement (R., pp.86-88.) The State argues that because
the entry was lawful, exigent circumstances exception should apply. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.6-7.) Ms. Greco contends the district court correctly decided the issue.
"[P]revent[ing] the imminent destruction of evidence" has long been
recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search.
Over the years, lower courts have developed an exception to the
exigent circumstances rule, the so-called "police-created exigency"
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doctrine. Under this doctrine, police may not rely on the need to prevent
destruction of evidence when that exigency was "created" or
"manufactured" by the conduct of the police.
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct 1849, 1856-57 (2011) (citations omitted).

Because the

State unlawfully entered the home, the exigency exception does not apply.

3.

The District Court Correctly Determined That The Search Warrant
Application Did Not Establish Probable Cause

The State asserts that even in the absence of the evidence found in violation of
Ms. Greco's constitutional rights, the search warrant application established probable
cause. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-10.) The district court correctly decided that the State
failed to meet its burden of proof to obtain the search warrant (R., pp.89-92.)
In determining the validity of a search warrant whose underlying
application contains illegally obtained information, the ultimate question is
whether "the remaining information presented to the magistrate, after the
tainted evidence is excluded, contains adequate facts from which the
magistrate could have concluded that probable cause existed for the
issuance of the search warrant." Doe v. State, 131 Idaho 851, 853, 965
P2d 816, 818 (1998) (quoting State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224, 228, 923
P.2d 469,473 (Ct.App.1996)); see also State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516,
526, 716 P.2d 1288, 1298 (1986). Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that in determining the validity of a search
warrant "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him ... there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983); see
also State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 684, 672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983).
Furthermore, "the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the
magistrate had a substantial basis for ... concluding that probable cause
existed." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 LEd.2d at 548;
Lang, 105 Idaho at 684, 672 P.2d 561.
State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 779 (1999).
In certain exceptional instances, an affidavit containing such hearsay on
hearsay will withstand attack. To do so, facts indicating: (1) The reliability
of the initial source and the sufficiency of the supporting circumstances as
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to the existence of probable cause; and (2) The reliability of the source of
the information to the affiant, must be placed in the affidavit so that the
magistrate may make his determination of probable cause.
State v. Oropeza, 97 Idaho 387, 391 (1976)

In the instant case, the district court correctly decided that after removing the
improper evidence included in the search warrant, probable cause did not exist to
believe evidence of a crime would have been discovered in Ms. Greco's bedroom.
Chief Tveidt provided testimony to the magistrate and the transcript has been
augmented into the record for review of whether the magistrate would have possessed
probable cause after the tainted evidence had been removed. (Order Granting Motion
to Augment the Record, dated June 28, 2012; hereinafter Transcript for Search
Warrant.)
Chief Tveidt informed the magistrate that he received information from Mel, an
alleged family member to Ms. Greco. (Transcript for Search Warrant, p.3, Ls.20-24.) At
first, Chief Tvedit claimed Mel resided at the residence with Ms. Greco (Transcript for
Search Warrant, p.3, Ls.21-22), then he asserted that Mel lived in Middleton (Transcript
for Search Warrant, p.3, Ls.23-24 ). Then he later revealed that it is Mel's wife that has
most of the information and that she is the one that visits Ms. Greco's house more
regularly.

(Transcript for Search Warrant, p.4, L.24-p.5, L.2.)

Chief Tveidt did not

speak with Mel's wife. (Transcript for Search Warrant, p.5, Ls.1-2.) Mel reported that
there is a concern that Ms. Greco may be selling her grandmother's cancer medication
and they believe there are visitors coming to the house to purchase narcotics.
(Transcript for Search Warrant, p.4, Ls.7-18.) Additionally, after receiving reports from a
school principal about Ms. Greco's son's potential marijuana use, Chief Tveidt
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interviewed the child at the school.

(Transcript for Search Warrant, p.6, L.14.)

Ms. Greco's son admitted that he smoked marijuana and that he had a bong in his
bedroom. (Transcript for Search Warrant, p.6, Ls.17-19.) The child also stated that his
mom has visitors that come over to the house for a short period of time. (Transcript for
Search Warrant, p.6, Ls.17-19.) Under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate
lacked probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be located in any place
other than the child's bedroom. The district court judge correctly concluded that the
magistrate judge lacked probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for the entire
house.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Greco respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's Decision
on Motion to Suppress,
DATED this 21 st day of September, 2012.
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